Newsroom: Bogus Reviewed in New York Times by Roger Williams University School of Law
Roger Williams University
DOCS@RWU
Life of the Law School (1993- ) Archives & Law School History
12-9-2011
Newsroom: Bogus Reviewed in New York Times
Roger Williams University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/law_archives_life
This News Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archives & Law School History at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Life of the Law School (1993- ) by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger Williams University School of Law, "Newsroom: Bogus Reviewed in New York Times" (2011). Life of the Law School (1993- ).
235.
https://docs.rwu.edu/law_archives_life/235
Newsroom 
Bogus Reviewed in New York Times 
Professor Carl Bogus' new book, "William F. Buckley Jr. and the Rise of American Conservatism" is reviewed in the 
New York Times' Sunday Book Review.  
From THE NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY BOOK REVIEW: "William F. Buckley Jr.: Right Man, Right 
Time" by Geoffrey Kabaservice 
Published: December 9, 2011 (Online); December 11, 2011 (Print) 
BUCKLEY: William F. Buckley Jr. and the Rise of American Conservatism 
By Carl T. Bogus 
Illustrated. 405 pp.  
Bloomsbury Press. $30. 
William F. Buckley Jr. was an immodest man 
with much to be immodest about. Not only was he the high priest of the modern American conservative 
movement and the founding editor in chief of its leading intellectual publication, National Review; he was 
also a gifted polemicist, best-selling novelist, sesquipedalian speaker, television star, political candidate, 
yachtsman, harpsichordist, wit and bon vivant. Small wonder that I once saw him nod approvingly when a 
tongue-tied freshman referred to his 1951 autobiographical best seller as “God as Man at Yale.” He 
performed his many roles with such panache, and such obvious enjoyment of being William F. Buckley 
Jr., that he captivated people who otherwise would have despised someone who did much to move the 
United States politically to the right from the early 1950s until his death in 2008. But even liberals had to 
laugh when Buckley, asked whether he slouched in his chair as host of the TV program “Firing Line” 
because he couldn’t think on his feet, drawled, “It is hard . . . to stand up . . . under the weight . . . of all 
that I know.” 
Perhaps the most notable distinction of Carl T. Bogus’s generally admiring biography, “Buckley,” is that 
the author, a law professor at Roger Williams University, is a self-professed liberal. At a time when 
liberals and conservatives agree on almost nothing, both sides can unite in their esteem for Buckley. What 
this unlikely convergence suggests, however, is that neither side has an accurate view of his real 
significance. The left misconceives his role as the founder of the conservative movement, and the right 
ignores how far the movement has diverged from Buckley’s example. 
Bogus aims to explain conservatism’s rise to 
success by concentrating on Buckley during “the seminal period of the creation of the modern 
conservative movement,” from the inception of National Review in 1955 to Richard Nixon’s election in 
1968. Much of the first half of the book nonetheless covers developments in conservative thinking in 
previous decades, analyzing the competing strains of traditionalism, libertarianism and early -
neoconservatism. 
Bogus identifies traditionalist conservatism with the views of the 18th-century British statesman Edmund 
Burke and his latter-day adherents, notably Russell Kirk and the short-lived “new conservative” movement 
of the early 1950s. The traditionalists venerated deeply rooted communities and cultures, and worshiped 
established institutions and elites. They feared transformative ideologies and capitalism’s potential for 
creative destruction. Traditionalists did not resist all change, Bogus points out, but they were pragmatists 
at heart: with Burke, they “believed that changes should be made carefully and with a healthy respect for 
the risks of unintended consequences.” Set against them were the libertarians, who advocated unfettered 
individual freedom and an unregulated free market, and the neoconservatives, whom Bogus somewhat 
anachronistically equates with the most aggressive cold war interventionists seeking to “roll back” 
Communism around the globe. 
Buckley’s principal accomplishment, in Bogus’s view, was that he set the course of modern conservatism 
by siding with the libertarians and neoconservatives against the traditionalists. From his hierophant’s chair 
at National Review, he marginalized Kirk and the new conservatives and excommunicated extremists, 
including John Birch Society paranoids and Ayn Rand, whose atheism and materialism undermined his 
drive to make conservatism respectable. Buckley was not only the chief strategist and tactician behind the 
scenes of the conservative movement, but also conservatism’s “most visible representative.” He used his 
celebrity and skill at intellectual debate to attract new recruits, from Ronald Reagan and Pat Buchanan to 
Karl Rove and Rush Limbaugh, and to lead the movement toward political success, culminating in 
Reagan’s election as president in 1980. Bogus declares that “without Buckley and National Review, 
Reagan’s election would not have been possible.” 
But this was a hollow victory, according to Bogus, since the right-wing ideology that Buckley brought to 
power betrayed what was best in the American conservative tradition as embodied by Robert Taft, the 
Ohio senator who dominated the Republican Party from the late ’30s through the early ’50s. Taft’s 
conservatism was essentially Burkean traditionalism, marked by pragmatism, prudence and skepticism 
toward aggressive foreign and domestic government schemes. If Buckley had not sidelined the 
traditionalist views of Taft and Kirk, Bogus argues, conservatism might have avoided its worst errors, 
including approval of Southern segregation, misdiagnosis of the cold war, support for military adventurism 
from Vietnam to Iraq, and cultivation of antigovernment attitudes that made a virtue of government 
incompetence and led to failures like FEMA under George W. Bush and the financial crisis. 
Bogus is particularly good at using Burke, Kirk and Taft as Cassandra figures to bewail the wrong turnings 
of the right. His discussion of the various intellectual players is well informed, and he makes a useful 
contribution to understanding the contending variations of modern American conservatism. But his 
argument gets lost in a thicket of irrelevant digressions, from a recapitulation of “Atlas Shrugged” to a 
potted history of Vietnam, and loses sight of Buckley himself. 
Bogus only sketchily describes Buckley’s life and work, National Review’s creation and development, and 
the growth of the conservative movement, all of which are covered in much greater depth in other books. 
While Bogus applauds Buckley’s success in building what he calls “the most successful journal of opinion 
in history,” he disdains Buckley as a thinker. He maintains that Buckley “inherited his father’s philosophy,” 
which had been formed by Will Sr.’s experiences in the Mexican Revolution, and failed to modify those 
secondhand beliefs in response to the changing American context. Bogus gives short shrift to Buckley’s 
intimate knowledge of texts and thinkers his father never encountered, his intellectual mentors (notably 
Whittaker Chambers and Willmoore Kendall), and his books, none of which are analyzed in detail. 
In flatly identifying Buckley as a libertarian and dismissing National Review’s “fusionism,” Bogus 
underestimates Buckley’s masterly ability to hold together a movement that was riven by internal 
contradictions. In truth, Buckley considered himself a traditionalist as much as a libertarian, and artfully 
refused to take either of those tendencies to their logical conclusions. He opposed fanatics of all stripes. 
As a committed Catholic, he resisted the libertarian impulse to undermine established authority and 
devolve into anarchy. And while Buckley respected traditionalists like Kirk and the Agrarians (whom Bogus 
doesn’t mention), he believed that Kirk was too fey in his medievalism, and the Southerners too openly 
desirous of owning black people, to allow them to dictate the conservative position. Bogus also overlooks 
Buckley’s pragmatic evolution, evident in his famous pronouncement that he would support “the most 
right, viable candidate” rather than the most uncompromising conservative. Indeed, Buckley’s pragmatism, 
tolerant spirit and intellectual sophistication are notably absent from the conservative movement today. 
And yet Bogus’s attempt to credit the success of the conservative movement almost exclusively to 
Buckley is ivory tower history with a vengeance. Ideas have consequences, but they don’t make political 
realities by themselves. Liberals yearn for a Buckley of their own, someone who can build a movement on 
the left through the force of personality and philosophy. But they too often neglect the role of grubbier 
figures like William Rusher, Richard Viguerie and Paul Weyrich, none of whom are likely to attract 
admiring liberal biographers but who arguably did more than Buckley to mobilize conservatism as a 
political force at the grass roots. Until liberals see the history of the conservative movement whole, they 
are unlikely to learn from it. 
********** 
Geoffrey Kabaservice’s latest book, “Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of 
the Republican Party, From Eisenhower to the Tea Party,” will be published in January. A version of this 
review appeared in print on December 11, 2011, on page BR28 of the Sunday Book Review with the 
headline: Right Man, Right Time. 
To read the full story, click here. [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/books/review/buckley-william-f-
buckley-jr-and-the-rise-of-american-conservatism-by-carl-t-bogus-book-review.html?_r=2&] 
 
